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A NEW APPROACH TO NINETEENTH-
CENTURY RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION CASES 
Wesley J. Campbell* 
Scholars frequently cite early nineteenth-century cases to ascertain the orig-
inal meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Previous studies, however, have ig-
nored crucial trends in those decisions, thus leading to mistaken emphasis on the 
denial of religious accommodation claims. This Note argues that prevailing theo-
logical views, skepticism of courtroom declarations of religious belief, and con-
temporary notions of judicial deference better explain nineteenth-century cases 
than does a wholesale rejection of judicially enforceable religious exemptions. 
This novel approach clarifies previously unexplained tensions in early free exer-
cise opinions. It also suggests that the Supreme Court’s holding in Employment 
Division v. Smith is inconsistent with many nineteenth-century decisions, not-
withstanding Justice Scalia’s claim to the contrary in his concurrence in City of 
Boerne v. Flores. Moreover, past studies have failed to appreciate the enormous 
midcentury shift in constitutional meaning in response to Mormon polygamy and 
widespread Catholic immigration. This transformation leaves originalism incap-
able of providing a consistent account of the Free Exercise Clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Employment Division v. Smith,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not provide a right to reli-
gious exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws.2 That is, civil and 
criminal rules apply to everyone, irrespective of whether those rules conflict 
with an individual’s religious views. In Smith, five Justices accepted Oregon’s 
withholding of unemployment benefits from two Native Americans who had 
been fired because their sacramental use of peyote was criminal under the 
state’s controlled substance laws.3 The Court’s unexpected overturning of 
precedent4 ignited a firestorm of debate among legal scholars, most of whom 
objected to the majority’s holding and methodology.5 One prominent criticism 
was the Court’s omission of any historical evidence.6  
The Supreme Court revisited the Free Exercise Clause seven years later in 
City of Boerne v. Flores.7 Congress had overridden Smith by passing the Reli-
 
 1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 2. Id. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obliga-
tion to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 3. For a brief discussion of Smith’s procedural history, see Michael W. McConnell, 
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111-14 (1990) 
(noting that the issue before the Court was hypothetical and that neither party briefed the 
Court on the constitutional basis for granting exemptions). A more thorough account appears 
in GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL (2001). 
 4. Rather than expressly overturning precedents such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) (accommodating religiously motivated conduct within a state unemployment 
program), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting Amish parents from 
compulsory school attendance laws), the Court in Smith stated that Sherbert was particular to 
unemployment cases in which the conduct at issue was noncriminal, 494 U.S. at 883-84, and 
that Yoder was limited to “hybrid” situations in which plaintiffs claimed additional rights 
such as parental discretion, id. at 881-82.  
 5. See, e.g., John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise 
Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71 (1991); James D. Gordon III, 
Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Su-
preme Court’s Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief that Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. 
& RELIGION 99 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Su-
preme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259; McConnell, supra note 3; Roald Mykkelt-
vedt, Employment Division v. Smith: Creating Anxiety by Relieving Tension, 58 TENN. L. 
REV. 603 (1991); Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 519 (1994). 
 6. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the 
Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1794-
95 (2006) (noting that the Court in Smith “rewrote the law of free exercise without a glance 
at original understanding”); McConnell, supra note 3, at 1117 (stating that Justice Scalia’s 
bypass of historical evidence “is particularly surprising because . . . Justice Scalia[] has been 
one of the Court’s foremost exponents of the view that the Constitution should be interpreted 
in light of its original meaning”). 
 7. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
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gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),8 which provided religious ex-
emptions from federal and state laws, even if the laws were neutral and general-
ly applicable.9 In Boerne, the Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied 
to the states. Most Justices agreed that Congress had exceeded its authority un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; Justice O’Connor dissented, how-
ever, arguing on originalist grounds that the Court should overturn Smith.10 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Boerne responded to Justice 
O’Connor’s originalist critique of the Smith holding. The concurring and dis-
senting opinions wrestled with early colonial, state, and federal accommoda-
tions, such as statutory and constitutional provisions exempting Quakers and 
other conscientious objectors from conscription laws. Most of the elements of 
this debate have been thoroughly canvassed elsewhere.11 Justice Scalia’s con-
cluding remark, however, has received insufficient scholarly attention.12 He 
wrote: 
 It seems to me that the most telling point made by the dissent is to be 
found, not in what it says, but in what it fails to say. Had the understanding in 
the period surrounding the ratification of the Bill of Rights been that the vari-
ous forms of accommodation discussed by the dissent were constitutionally 
required (either by State Constitutions or by the Federal Constitution), it 
would be surprising not to find a single state or federal case refusing to en-
force a generally applicable statute because of its failure to make accommoda-
 
 8. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 9. The law included limiting provisions, such as the opportunity for the government 
to prove a compelling interest in uniform enforcement of the law. Id. § 3, 107 Stat. at 
1488-89. 
 10. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 564-65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 11. For historical arguments against exemptions, see Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: 
Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 
(1991); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); and Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-
Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 
10 J.L. & RELIGION 367 (1993-1994).  
For historical arguments in favor of exemptions, see Michael W. McConnell, The Ori-
gins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 
1512 (1990) (arguing that “the modern [pre-Smith] doctrine of free exercise exemptions is 
more consistent with the original understanding than is a position that leads only to the facial 
neutrality of legislation”); and Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2004) (supporting the position that state and federal free exercise clauses 
require religious exemptions). See generally Clark B. Lombardi, Nineteenth-Century Free 
Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of Polygamy: The Relevance of Nineteenth-
Century Cases and Commentaries for Contemporary Debates About Free Exercise Exemp-
tions, 85 OR. L. REV. 369, 370 (2006) (arguing that “the research presented by each group of 
originalists is selective, and their conclusions are ultimately not convincing”). 
 12. For a very brief response to Justice Scalia’s argument, see Michael W. McConnell, 
Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique of Justice 
Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819, 
840 (1998). 
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tion. Yet the dissent cites none—and to my knowledge, and to the knowledge 
of the academic defenders of the dissent’s position, none exists.13 
Indeed, the dissent provided no account of early religious exemption cases and 
offered only silence in response to Justice Scalia’s critique of this omission. 
This Note disputes Justice Scalia’s claim that the dearth of successfully li-
tigated nineteenth-century exemption claims reveals a lack of historical support 
for religious accommodations. Rather than being “the most telling point,” the 
absence of exemption decisions reflects historical differences that call into 
question overly simplistic originalist arguments. In particular, prevailing theo-
logical views, skepticism of courtroom declarations, and judicial deference bet-
ter explain nineteenth-century cases than does a wholesale rejection of judicial-
ly enforceable religious exemptions. Understanding these factors also helps 
explain the apparent erosion of support for religious accommodations in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. This reinterpretation of the historical record 
suggests not only that Smith and Boerne may be inconsistent with original 
meaning but also that an originalist approach to the Free Exercise Clause does 
not account for shifts in ideas about religious freedom preceding the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This Note attempts to explain nineteenth-century federal and state exemp-
tion decisions on their own terms. Part I introduces the relevance of early nine-
teenth-century cases to an understanding of original meaning. Part II surveys 
the historical background of religious liberty cases, beginning with a descrip-
tion of how contemporary theological views constrained the scope of free exer-
cise claims. It then turns to relatively unexplored evidence—testimonial-
exclusion cases and statutory-exemption cases—in order to illustrate pervasive 
skepticism toward courtroom declarations of religious belief. Lastly, the Part 
discusses contemporary understandings of judicial review and identifies how 
notions of judicial deference permeated other religious liberty decisions. Part 
III then evaluates the few reported antebellum religious exemption cases, and 
contends that skepticism and deference have more explanatory power than oth-
er theories in expositing early nineteenth-century outcomes. The Conclusion 
analyzes the import of this evidence to modern free exercise debates. Respond-
ing to Justice Scalia’s remark, this Note argues that the number of successfully 
litigated claims is an inappropriate historical tool for determining whether reli-
gious exemptions were constitutionally required.  
 
 13. 521 U.S. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Gerard Bradley makes a 
similar argument:  
 There is one sure way to find out who is right—go to the cases. If the drafters and ratifiers 
of 1789-91 entertained apprehensions of the Free Exercise Clause like the one apprehended 
by the Sherbert Court in 1963, there ought to be some early conduct exemption cases. But the 
Supreme Court’s first square confrontation with Free Exercise was in 1878. It unequivocally 
rejected the conduct exemption. 
Bradley, supra note 11, at 272 (footnotes omitted). 
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I. ORIGINAL MEANING 
Originalist methodology has evolved substantially over the past twenty-
five years. Initially focused on what the framers intended, scholars gradually 
shifted their attentions to the elected delegates who ratified the Constitution. 
Recent efforts have moved a step further, arguing that judges should evaluate 
constitutional text based on the contemporary public meaning of its words and 
phrases.14 
To ascertain the original meaning of various constitutional provisions, legal 
scholars often look to early nineteenth-century cases.15 The similarity of vari-
ous state declarations of rights to the Federal Bill of Rights makes state deci-
sions a useful source for interpreting the First Amendment.16 Moreover, early 
nineteenth-century decisions are particularly important with respect to incorpo-
rated rights, which have two points of reference for original meaning. That is, 
nineteenth-century cases may elucidate the Bill of Rights as ratified in 1791, 
but they also can clarify what these rights meant when applied to the states in 
1868.17 Although originalists rarely consider original meaning in both periods, 
at times this dual approach may be critical. It is axiomatic in modern constitu-
tional law that incorporated rights operate equally on the federal and state gov-
ernments.18 Therefore, identifying a single original meaning for provisions of 
 
 14. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 
(1999); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004). 
For critiques of recent originalist methodology, see Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of 
Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150 (2007); and Ste-
phen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185. 
 15. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 198-203 (2003); William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 
792-94 (1995); see also Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes, 72 BROOK. L. 
REV. 493, 549 (2007) (collecting cases). See generally H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Origi-
nalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 677 (1987) (“Originalism itself then seems to require attention 
to the subsequent interpretive tradition.”). 
 16. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1 (“The free exercise and enjoyment of 
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall, forever hereaf-
ter, be allowed.”). 
 17. See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First 
Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1068 n.64 (2009) (“Sources from the first half of the nine-
teenth century . . . are also relevant to understanding the original meaning of the First 
Amendment in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, because it is the Four-
teenth Amendment that has been read as applying the First Amendment to the states.” (cita-
tions omitted)). For doubts concerning the originalist basis for incorporation, see Lawrence 
Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Mean-
ing and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361 (2009). The mod-
ern Court, however, has shown little willingness to question the merits or legitimacy of in-
corporation. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
 18. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 (“[I]ncorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are 
all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same 
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the Bill of Rights relies on there having been consonant understandings in 1791 
and 1868. 
This Note offers a new interpretation of early free exercise decisions. It 
does not aim to prove a particular constitutional meaning of free exercise in 
1791 or 1868. Indeed, this Note focuses on the difficulties in proving a particu-
lar constitutional meaning of free exercise. To the extent that nineteenth-
century decisions illuminate founding-era public meaning, however, they sug-
gest that Smith and Boerne may be inconsistent with the original understanding 
of religious freedom. Nevertheless, a significant shift in adjudication of exemp-
tion claims around the Civil War casts serious doubt on the viability of a cohe-
rent originalist approach to the Free Exercise Clause. Nineteenth-century ac-
commodation cases therefore illustrate an especially problematic feature of 
attempts to discern the original meaning of incorporated rights. 
II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY CONTEXT 
A. Theology 
In the late eighteenth century, robust protection for religious freedom pre-
sented little threat to the uniform application of American laws. First, the scope 
of federal and state laws was generally quite limited and therefore less likely to 
interfere with religious exercise.19 Moreover, prevailing theological views also 
created very few conflicts between law and religion. As William Marshall ob-
serves, “the culture of the United States in the late eighteenth century was fairly 
homogeneous, being composed almost entirely of Christian sects whose prac-
tices were unlikely to violate non-religious societal norms.”20 To be sure, some 
sects, such as Quakers, had conscientious scruples to obeying militia laws and 
to swearing oaths. Jews and Seventh-Day Adventists sometimes refused to at-
tend court on Saturdays. But these were about the only examples of direct con-
flicts between law and religion, and statutes or common practice usually ac-
commodated these minority views.  
Denominational control over religion during this period helps explain not 
only why there were so few conflicts between law and religion but also why the 
 
standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’” (citations omit-
ted)). Of course, some rights and particular remedies have not been incorporated. 
 19. See McConnell, supra note 11, at 1466 (“[G]overnments of that era were far less 
intrusive than the governments of today.”). Judicial reporters also were far less prolific. 
 20. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exer-
cise Exemption, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 363, 383 (1989). American religious experience and theo-
logical views were remarkably diverse, as was particularly apparent in Christological dis-
putes, see Jon Butler, Coercion, Miracle, Reason: Rethinking the American Religious 
Experience in the Revolutionary Age, in RELIGION IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 1, 13-14 (Ro-
nald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1994), but these divisions rarely produced conflicts 
with the law. 
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idea of free exercise exemptions was itself nonthreatening. Even though the Re-
formation and eighteenth-century Great Awakening had emphasized individual 
relationships with God, doctrinal matters were still resolved communally—
usually at the denominational level.21 This background understanding of where 
religious scruples came from had a profound effect on the stability and accep-
tability of religious accommodations. In particular, communal control over re-
ligious doctrine constrained individuals from easily fabricating their own con-
scientious objections.22 
Given this religious context, courts unsurprisingly looked to denomination-
al teachings when considering the sincerity of an individual’s religious claims. 
In an early nineteenth-century case, for example, Samuel McIntire was sum-
moned as a juror but refused to swear to an oath, offering to affirm instead.23 
Affirmations, however, were meant to accommodate only those with religious 
scruples against swearing.24 McIntire stated “that he preferred affirming to 
swearing; that he was not a quaker, nor attached to any particular religious 
sect.”25 Judge William Cranch ordered McIntire into custody, releasing him on-
ly after he consented to swear.26 During the same term, Wilson Bryan refused 
to be sworn as a juror, “alleging that he was a Methodist.”27 Cranch asked him 
“whether it was contrary to the principles of that religious society to take an 
oath.”28 Bryan replied that “he did not know that it was; but that although he 
had heretofore been sworn on juries, yet he was determined not to take an oath 
 
 21. As early as the Reformation, Protestants had emphasized personal explorations of 
biblical meaning, thus usurping Papal authority to define church dogma. Nevertheless, Prot-
estant leaders retained significant control over theology. See NATHAN O. HATCH, THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 179-80 (1989). The eighteenth-century 
Great Awakening reemphasized individual, spiritual relationships with God, but this move-
ment hardly displaced religious authority. See id. at 186 (“Revivals of the 1740s drew upon 
millennial themes to challenge believers to a greater commitment to traditional values.”); 
Butler, supra note 20, at 8. 
 22. For a discussion of the relative stability of religious views in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, see MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 114-57 (2002). Additionally, would-be dissenters also faced difficulty 
publishing their ideas absent the widespread access to printing presses that developed in the 
early nineteenth century. See HATCH, supra note 21, at 127. Therefore, although there were 
important theological differences between sects, see Butler, supra note 20, at 13, the result-
ing religious debates were unlikely to spur opposition to government laws. 
 23. McIntire’s Case, 16 F. Cas. 151 (C.C.D.C. 1804) (No. 8824).  
 24. Quakers, for instance, relied on the biblical injunction, “[s]wear not at all.” Mat-
thew 5:34 (King James). For a brief discussion of affirmations, see Eugene R. Milhizer, So 
Help Me Allah: An Historical and Prudential Analysis of Oaths as Applied to the Current 
Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in America, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 37-40 
(2009). 
 25. McIntire’s Case, 16 F. Cas. at 151. 
 26. Id. (“Upon his offering to be sworn without kissing the book, but holding up his 
hand, he was discharged.”). 
 27. Bryan’s Case, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch C.C.) 151, 151 (C.C.D.C. 1804). 
 28. Id. 
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again.”29 Again, the court ordered the prospective juror into custody until he 
agreed to swear.30  
There is no indication that McIntire or Bryan claimed a religious exemp-
tion based on constitutional rather than statutory grounds.31 Therefore, these 
short cases tell us little about how the court might have interpreted a direct 
claim of exemption under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
Nevertheless, they illustrate the importance of denominational membership in 
providing the court with evidence of individual beliefs. In McIntire’s Case, 
Cranch held that a juror will not be permitted to affirm where it appears that he 
is “not a quaker, nor attached to any particular religious sect.”32 The report of 
Bryan’s Case states: “A juror cannot be permitted to make solemn affirmation 
in lieu of oath, unless he be one of those people who hold it unlawful to take an 
oath on any occasion.”33 In fact, the court did not ask in either case whether the 
prospective juror had individual conscientious scruples. Instead, the pivotal 
question was whether the juror’s religious sect endorsed such scruples.34 
Religious individualism, however, spread quickly in the early republic. Just 
as revolutionary ideals eroded deference to political elites,35 so too did church 
authorities lose their grasp on matters of religious doctrine.36 Nathan Hatch de-
scribes the early republic era as “the most centrifugal epoch in American 
church history[,] . . . a time when the momentum of events pushed toward the 
periphery and subverted centralized authority and professional expertise.”37 In 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (noting that, on the following day, Bryan “submitted to be sworn, and was 
sworn by holding up his hand”). 
 31. Indeed, it is unclear whether either McIntire or Bryan claimed a religious exemp-
tion at all. Some individuals worried that swearing raised the possibility of divine punish-
ment if they erred as jurors. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: 
THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 75-76 (2008). The statement by McIntire that 
he “preferred affirming to swearing” suggests that he did not assert a right to a religious ex-
emption, while Bryan’s claim that “he was determined not to take an oath again” may indi-
cate religious opposition to taking oaths rather than mere distaste for the religious risk of tak-
ing an oath. Neither Bryan nor McIntire belonged to a sect which taught against swearing. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that Bryan’s and McIntire’s individual readings of the Bible led 
to personal beliefs in line with Quaker thinking on this question.  
 32. McIntire’s Case, 16 F. Cas. 151 (C.C.D.C. 1804) (No. 8824). 
 33. Bryan’s Case, 1 Cranch C.C. at 151. Cranch, who was both the judge and the re-
porter, wrote this quotation in the case heading. 
 34. While riding circuit in 1815, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story considered a 
similar case in which a witness claimed conscientious scruples but was not a Quaker. Massa-
chusetts had a law that permitted only Quakers to affirm. Story held the witness in contempt, 
stating “that the law was preemptory,” and that it would be enforced “however unwilling the 
Court might be to adopt so harsh a measure.” United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 622 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858). 
 35. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1991). 
 36. See HATCH, supra note 21, at 10, 182.  
 37. Id. at 15; see also id. at 40-43. 
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particular, individuals began to define their own religious beliefs, usually based 
on their own readings of scripture.38  
Theological individualism presented a potentially unanswerable challenge 
to the concept of religious exemptions. Namely, if people could define their 
own beliefs, they could fraudulently claim conscientious scruples with impuni-
ty. Revivals of the early nineteenth century, however, emphasized the sole au-
thority of scripture,39 which effectively limited the scope of potential religious 
objections to those based on biblical text. Moreover, textual claims offered 
judges an opportunity to reject what they saw as misguided understandings of 
scripture. 
B. Skepticism 
Judges in the early nineteenth century were well aware of their inability to 
look within the consciences of others. Unlike modern jurists,40 however, these 
judges were highly doubtful of individual declarations of faith and often ap-
plied their own views on matters of religious doctrine. This skepticism—
broadly defined as an unwillingness to acknowledge the sincerity of religious 
claims—pervades early free exercise cases such that using outcomes to ascer-
tain larger principles may mislead as much as it informs. 
Early nineteenth-century evidence rules illustrate some of the background 
assumptions animating judicial skepticism. Common law dictated that interest-
ed parties—including the litigants and persons with a pecuniary stake in the 
outcome—were incompetent to testify.41 In 1846, Michigan became the first 
 
 38. See id. at 182 (“[I]n the assertion that private judgment should be the ultimate tri-
bunal in religious matters, common people started a revolution.”); GORDON S. WOOD, 
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 609 (2009) (describ-
ing theological individualism). In 1801, Reverend Andrew Fuller reiterated that civil magi-
strates have no power to interfere with religious sentiments. “But of late,” he noted,  
men have pleaded, not only an exemption from civil penalties on account of their religious 
principles, in which the very essence of persecution consists, but also that they are not sub-
ject to the control of a religious society with which they may stand connected, for any tenets 
which they think proper to avow.  
8 ANDREW FULLER, THE WORKS OF THE REV. ANDREW FULLER 265 (New Haven, S. Con-
verse 1825). 
 39. See HATCH, supra note 21, at 179-83 (describing the importance of sola scriptura 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). 
 40. Modern sincerity analysis is discussed in Marjorie Heins, “Other People’s 
Faiths”: The Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 153, 172-82 (1981); and Stephen Senn, The Prosecution of Religious Fraud, 17 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 325 (1990). 
 41. See Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An 
Historical Survey, 70 KY. L.J. 91, 91 (1981). There were occasional exceptions. See, e.g., 
Noble v. People, 1 Ill. (Breese) 54, 56 (1822) (permitting a victim of forgery to testify on the 
grounds of “necessity and public policy” even though he stood to benefit financially from a 
successful prosecution).  
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state to admit witnesses with a financial interest in the outcome.42 Connecticut 
soon thereafter passed the first law allowing civil parties to testify.43 Most 
states did not relax their competency rules until decades later.44 Though there 
were other justifications for these strict rules,45 they illustrate pervasive distrust 
in self-interested evidence. 
Testimonial exclusions based on defect of religious principle reveal partic-
ular skepticism of courtroom declarations of faith. According to common law 
evidence rules, witnesses were required to believe in God and divine punish-
ment,46 both of which were thought necessary to feel bound by an oath.47 New 
York Chief Justice Ambrose Spencer restated the rationale for oaths in the 
famous case of Jackson v. Gridley: “[N]o testimony is entitled to credit, unless 
delivered under the solemnity of an oath, which comes home to the conscience 
of the witness, and will create a tie arising from his belief that false swearing 
would expose him to punishment in the life to come.”48  
Incompetency by defect of religious principle was a common law doctrine, 
but the manner in which American courts found witnesses incompetent di-
verged significantly from the English tradition. In England, witnesses testified 
directly about their religious views, and a witness’s statement affirming the re-
quisite beliefs was sufficient to establish competency.49 American judges, 
however, charted a different course. As the Connecticut Supreme Court of Er-
rors articulated in 1809: “It would seem to be incongruous to admit a man to 
his oath for the purpose of learning from him whether he had the necessary 
 
 42. George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 659 (1997). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 668-69. 
 45. The nineteenth-century judicial system still adhered, at least nominally, to the no-
tion that testimony under oath should not conflict. Thus, exclusions did not necessarily indi-
cate that the probative value of testimony was less than its propensity to deceive. Rather, ex-
clusions reduced the incidence of testimonial conflicts. See id. at 704-05. 
 46. The contemporary phrase was “a future state of rewards and punishments.” JAMES 
HUTSON, FORGOTTEN FEATURES OF THE FOUNDING: THE RECOVERY OF RELIGIOUS THEMES IN 
THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 33 (2003). 
 47. For further discussion of historical oath rules, see Ronald P. Formisano & Stephen 
Pickering, The Christian Nation Debate and Witness Competency, 29 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 
219 (2009); Frank Swancara, Non-Religious Witnesses, 8 WIS. L. REV. 49 (1932); Thomas 
Raeburn White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect upon the Competency of 
Witnesses, 51 AM. L. REG. 373 (1903); and Paul W. Kaufman, Note, Disbelieving Nonbe-
lievers: Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in the Turn of the Century American Cour-
troom, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395 (2003). 
 48. Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).  
 49. See ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CASES 50 (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke 1810); White, supra note 47, at 407 (“The English 
cases all say interrogation of the witness is the only proper way to find out his belief. The 
English text-writers also take the same view . . . .”). 
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qualifications to be sworn.”50 Instead, parties called on others to recount the 
contested witness’s out-of-court religious declarations. 
Nearly all states disallowed direct questioning of witnesses regarding their 
religious views. In some instances, parties litigated the issue after a trial court 
denied a witness’s request to declare his or her own beliefs.51 But even in states 
without specific case law, the usual practice was to prove religious views 
through hearsay evidence.52 Occasionally, witnesses were allowed to testify 
 
 50. Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day 51, 56 (Conn. 1809). In his widely circulated Digest of the 
Law of Evidence, Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Zephaniah Swift elaborated on the ra-
tionales for preventing prospective witnesses from declaring their religious views. Voluntary 
statements, Swift argued, were subject to doubt since the witness “must be under the strong-
est possible inducement to answer in such manner as will not disqualify him, whatever may 
be his opinions.” SWIFT, supra note 49, at 49. Moreover, direct inquiries could not be com-
pelled because “[a] man’s opinions are matters between himself and his God, so long as he 
does not disclose them.” Id. Lastly, prohibiting courtroom declarations of belief avoided the 
unappealing prospect of turning away persons who proved their trustworthiness by declaring 
their own disqualifying belief. Id. Therefore, prohibiting witnesses to testify as to their own 
beliefs had several justifications, including religious freedom, judicial legitimacy, and skep-
ticism of courtroom declarations of belief. 
 51. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Ross, 28 F. Cas. 1346, 1347 n.2 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 
17,050) (holding that the proposed witnesses could not testify as to their own beliefs); Cur-
tiss, 4 Day at 56 (“It would seem to be incongruous to admit a man to his oath for the pur-
pose of learning from him whether he had the necessary qualifications to be sworn.”); Searcy 
v. Miller, 10 N.W. 912, 916 (Iowa 1881) (“The want of such religious belief must be estab-
lished by other means than the examination of the witness upon the stand. He is not to be 
questioned as to his religious belief, nor required to divulge his opinion upon that subject, in 
answer to questions put to him while under examination.”); Smith v. Coffin, 18 Me. 157, 164 
(1841) (stating that “according to decided cases, the person excepted against is not permitted 
to explain” his religious views); Thurston v. Whitney, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 104, 109 (1848) 
(stating that evidence of belief should be shown using out-of-court statements); Common-
wealth v. Wyman, Thacher’s Crim. Cas. 432, 435 (Bos. Mun. Ct. 1836) (“[I]t may be well 
doubted, whether it is proper to put a citizen on oath to declare his own turpitude.”); Den v. 
Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 589, 653 (1819) (stating that “infidelity” is proven “always by wit-
nesses”); Jackson, 18 Johns. at 104 (“[I]t would be incongruous to admit a man to his oath, 
to ascertain whether an oath had any binding influence on his conscience.”); Harrel v. State, 
38 Tenn. (1 Head) 125, 127 (1858) (“[T]he party seeking to exclude a witness . . . may adopt 
either mode of proof; and we adhere to this determination, as the better practice. If the wit-
ness really disregards the obligation of an oath, it would seem to be neither safe, nor consis-
tent, to resort to his examination.”); Scott v. Hooper, 14 Vt. 535, 539 (1842) (“It would 
seem, that the witness should not be interrogated respecting his disbelief in a ‘Supreme Be-
ing.’”); Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 632, 658 (1846) (finding error in the low-
er court’s “allowing the witness to be questioned on his voir dire touching his religious prin-
ciples”); Important Judicial Decision, 1 AM. MONTHLY MAG. & CRITICAL REV. 64, 65 (1817) 
(noting that, in an 1817 North Carolina Supreme Court case between unnamed parties, Jus-
tice John Louis Taylor stated that “it would be incongruous to permit a man to be sworn, 
when the very question was, whether he was qualified to swear”). 
 52. See, e.g., Norton v. Ladd, 4 N.H. 444 (1828); Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio 121, 126 
(1840). But see Cubbison v. M’Creary, 2 Watts & Serg. 262, 263 (Pa. 1841) (not reaching 
the question but nonetheless stating that “[t]here are . . . arguments of considerable weight in 
favour of allowing a witness . . . to state his present religious belief at the time of trial”). 
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directly, but this happened only when neither party objected to the inquiry.53 
Many states also adopted statutory or constitutional proscriptions against direct 
examinations.54  
Doubts about religious claims were not isolated to witness competency 
cases. Judges also were skeptical when a party asserted a specifically enume-
rated constitutional or statutory right to a religious exemption. In these cases, 
judges generally viewed individual declarations of belief as untrustworthy and 
prone to abuse. Denominational membership, by contrast, was a more reliable 
way of identifying the sincerity of personal beliefs. Religious norms in the ni-
neteenth century no longer emphasized unified and communally developed 
theology, but denominational affiliation was less likely to be fabricated than 
individual assertions of conscientious scruples.  
Statutory provisions in several states, for example, specified that conscien-
tious exemptions from militia service would only be available when certified 
by the religious organization to which the objector belonged.55 Massachusetts 
Supreme Court Justice George Thacher56 summarized the rationale for these 
rules during a speech at the 1819 Maine Constitutional Convention. 
 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 26 F. Cas. 761, 761 (C.C.D. Ill. 1843) (No. 
15,524) (“The witness having answered the question, without objection, it will be received. 
But, it may be proper to remark, that the modern practice is, not to interrogate the witness as 
to his religious belief.”); Commonwealth v. Barnard, Thacher’s Crim. Cas. 431 (Bos. Mun. 
Ct. 1835); Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 25 (1856); Jones v. Harris, 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 
160 (1846); Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 CAR. L.J. 202, 203 (1831) (S.C. Eq. Ct. 1827) (allow-
ing the prospective witness the opportunity to state his own religious views, though not un-
der oath).  
Courtroom declarations were allowed in some states after witness competency rules 
were dissolved and religious belief went only to a witness’s credibility. See, e.g., Stanbro v. 
Hopkins, 28 Barb. 265, 269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858) (“[I]nasmuch as persons who do not be-
lieve in the existence of a Supreme Being who will punish false swearing, are now compe-
tent to testify on oath, touching all matters in issue, on a trial, I am unable to perceive any 
good reason why the party against whom they are called may not interrogate them . . . as to 
their opinions on matters of religious belief.”). 
 54. See, e.g., An Act in Relation to the Competency of Witnesses § 1, 1842 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 21, 21-22 (“[N]o person shall be deemed incompetent as a witness in any court, matter 
or proceeding, on account of his opinions on the subject of religion; nor shall any witness be 
questioned in relation to his opinions thereon, either before or after he shall be sworn.”). 
These rules do not provide conclusive proof of courts’ unwillingness to trust any courtroom 
declarations of belief. As stated previously, judicial legitimacy and notions of religious free-
dom also help account for these rules. 
 55. See, e.g., An Act to Regulate and Discipline the Militia of This State, 1807 Md. 
Laws 339 (requiring “a certificate from a licensed preacher of the Gospel, or signed by the 
proper officer of the religious society to which such person may belong, stating that he has 
reason to believe, and verily does believe, from the religious and exemplary deportment and 
uniform declarations of such person, that he is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms”). 
 56. A former Federalist congressman from Massachusetts, Thacher was appointed to 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1800. Robert E. Moody, George Thacher, in 18 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 386 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936). 
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Judge Thacher enquired who was to determine what a man’s conscientious 
scruples were; and when they were sincere? . . . [H]e said, he did not think it a 
safe or proper principle for government to adopt, always to leave it to the con-
sciences of individuals, and simply for them to say whether they will obey a 
general law or not, and so, on that ground, claim an exemption from a general 
duty.57  
Nevertheless, Thacher clarified that exemptions from militia service could safe-
ly be extended to Quakers: “When it is proved that a person is of that denomi-
nation, it follows of consequence that he is opposed to war; there is no need of 
his making a declaration of his personal conscience . . . .”58 According to 
Thacher, individual assertions of conscientious objection were not to be trusted. 
But resting exemptions on denomination membership would provide, in some 
contexts, reasonable proof that a person’s views conflicted with the law.59 
Deciding that members of certain sects should be accommodated, however, 
still left open the question of how to prove religious membership. In Massachu-
setts, a statute required that Quakers seeking a religious exemption from militia 
service had to file a certificate signed by two elders and the clerk of their socie-
ty stating that the claimant was a member of the society, and that he “frequently 
and usually attends with said society for public worship, and we believe is con-
scientiously scrupulous of bearing arms.”60 In 1815, the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered whether to recognize an exemption certificate that deviated 
from the prescribed statutory language. The form stated that several claimants 
“attend with [the Quaker] society for public worship, and, we believe, are con-
scientiously scrupulous of bearing arms.”61 The court declared the certificate 
 
 57. JEREMIAH PERLEY, THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, OF THE 
CONVENTION OF DELEGATES 189-90 (Portland, A. Shirley 1820). 
 58. Id. at 197. He continued: “[W]henever any other sect of christians should become 
embodied and distinguished as the Quakers are, and afford the same evidence from their 
known principles and practice that war was their aversion and like them in consequence of 
their principles render an equivalent, he should be ready to vote their exemption . . . . But it 
must not be an hypocritical conscience.” Id. at 198. 
 59. The Maine delegates eventually decided that “[p]ersons of the denomination of 
Quakers and Shakers, shall be exempt from military duty.” PERLEY, supra note 57, at 186. 
After a vehement debate about whether conscientious objectors should have to pay an equiv-
alent tax to support the military—a tax which many Quakers found equally objectionable—
the convention voted down such a measure, deciding instead that the legislature should have 
authority to exempt militia members from paying their poll taxes “during the time they shall 
so do military duty.” Id. at 204. 
Some staunchly opposed what they perceived to be presumptions of insincerity. Enoch 
Lewis, for instance, wrote: “To presume that a plea of conscientious scruple is insincere, and 
upon that assumption to found a right to impose a penalty, is to reverse an established prin-
ciple of law, which always presumes innocence where guilty is not proved.” ENOCH LEWIS, 
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE MILITIA SYSTEM 12 (Philadelphia, A. Waldie 1831).  
 60. An Act for Regulating and Governing the Militia of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts § 6 (1800), in 3 THE PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
88, 89 (Boston, I. Thomas & E.T. Andrews 1801). 
 61. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 441 (1815). 
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“substantially defective” and wrote that “one may occasionally attend the meet-
ings, and yet not be acknowledged and received as a member of the society. So 
one not a Quaker or Shaker may be conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms; 
yet he is not exempted by the statute.”62 
Read in modern terms, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decla-
ration would seem to disprove constitutionally guaranteed religious exemp-
tions. The Massachusetts Constitution declared that “no subject shall be hurt, 
molested or restrained, in his person, liberty or estate, for worshipping God in 
the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience.”63 
If conscientiously scrupulous persons were not afforded exemptions, then sure-
ly a constitutional right to those exemptions did not exist. This argument, how-
ever, makes several untenable assumptions. First, the case was not litigated as a 
constitutional claim, so it is unclear whether the justices considered the ramifi-
cations of the Massachusetts declaration of rights. More significantly, the legis-
lature had created a statutory device for granting religious exemptions. A sub-
sequent militia exemption case clarified the court’s view that the legislative 
purpose in defining specific grounds for exemptions was to protect against 
fraudulent assertions of religious scruples. Writing for the court, Justice Samuel 
Wilde remarked:  
For to guard against fraud, [the legislators] have required additional and more 
satisfactory evidence of the existence of such scruples; and the evidence re-
quired by the statute cannot be dispensed with, even if other evidence of the 
fact, equally convincing, had been produced. . . . To prevent, as far as possi-
ble, the allowance of exemptions, under the pretence of religious scruples 
which do not exist, the legislature have interposed a check, in the form of the 
certificate; and this form must be strictly observed.64 
A similar case arose in Maine several years later when a certificate did not 
match the precise statutory language. This time, the justices accepted the certif-
icate, stating that it “substantially conforms to the law.”65 Nevertheless, they 
noted that their trust rested on the Quaker elders, not the applicant.66 
The legislative schemes in Massachusetts and Maine illustrate skepticism 
of self-interested declarations of conscientious scruples. As shown in the Mas-
sachusetts cases, courts sometimes adhered rigorously to legislative standards 
when determining whether individuals qualified for religious exemptions. This 
strict statutory interpretation reveals distrust of individuals claiming conscien-
 
 62. Id. at 442. 
 63. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. II.  
 64. Lees v. Childs, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 351, 354-55 (1821) (holding that proof of 
Quaker membership was insufficient to comply with the statutory certification). 
 65. Dole v. Allen, 4 Me. 527, 531 (1827). 
 66. See id. (“It is not to be presumed that persons, raised to the office of elders in a re-
ligious society, even if we could suppose them capable of disregarding the ties of con-
science, would so expose themselves in the eyes of their brethren and of the community, as 
to certify as true, what might be easily ascertained to be false.”). 
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tious scruples, but it also exemplifies the importance of judicial deference in 
defining the parameters for granting exemptions. 
C. Judicial Deference 
In addition to skepticism of courtroom declarations of belief, early nine-
teenth-century exemption claims were heavily constrained by contemporary no-
tions of judicial deference. Modern-day use of the term “judicial review” con-
notes both interpretive authority and finality. That is, today’s Supreme Court 
assumes it has authority to make constitutional decisions even when the answer 
is ambiguous, and it asserts that the majority opinion, once delivered, is the su-
preme law of the land.67 While some framers and ratifiers of the Constitution 
adhered to this expansive form of judicial review, the prevailing norm in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was considerably more modest.68 
Supreme Court Justice James Iredell summarized the restrained version of judi-
cial power in Calder v. Bull: “[A]s the authority to declare [a statute] void is of 
a delicate and awful nature, the court will never resort to that authority, but in a 
clear and urgent case.”69 Two years later, Justice William Paterson wrote that 
“to pronounce any law void, it must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the 
constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.”70 
The combination of deference to legislative judgments and skepticism of 
courtroom religious declarations made judicial enforcement of free exercise ex-
emptions highly unlikely, notwithstanding the possibility of such exemptions in 
theory.71 Two reasons may account for this difficulty. First, if a court was un-
 
 67. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting that Marbury v. Madison “declared the basic principle that 
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system”). 
 68. For prevailing founding-era views on judicial finality, see generally Larry D. Kra-
mer, Marbury and the Retreat from Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 205 (2003). 
This Note largely ignores the finality question and instead focuses on the importance of con-
stitutional clarity as a prerequisite for judicial review.  
 69. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 70. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (opinion of Paterson, J.); see also 
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 102 (2004); WOOD, supra note 38, at 433-68; William Michael Treanor, Judicial 
Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 458 (2005) (arguing that judges required 
clear proof of unconstitutionality in cases not involving breaches of judicial power or nation-
al power). Blasphemy decisions illustrate the extent of judicial deference afforded in reli-
gious freedom claims. See LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE 
SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 401-23 (1993). 
 71. But see Hamburger, supra note 11, at 931-32. Hamburger argues that founding-era 
views of judicial review make religious exemptions themselves unlikely to have been judi-
cially enforced, given (he argues) the dubious constitutional merits of such exemptions. Ap-
plied to the nineteenth century, his argument is difficult to reconcile with the numerous cases 
in which exemptions were either granted or referenced favorably in dicta. As this Note ar-
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certain whether an individual’s religious views genuinely conflicted with the 
law, the court faced the risk of granting an exemption without either legislative 
or constitutional approval. That is, if a claimant’s sincerity was not clearly es-
tablished, then a fortiori the constitutional basis for an exemption was not clear-
ly established.72 Courts also worried that deciding how to evaluate sincerity 
was itself a discretionary judgment best left to legislatures. Judges had little 
legislative or common law guidance regarding the grounds upon which such 
conscientious objections should be recognized. Statutory standards for granting 
religious exemptions varied widely between states.73 Therefore, although the 
constitutional principle of judicially enforceable religious exemptions might 
have existed, the procedure for determining when to afford such exemptions 
was highly uncertain. 
In his speech before the 1819 Maine Constitutional Convention, Judge 
Thacher summarized the importance of having clear standards for granting reli-
gious objections. Addressing the topic of militia exemptions for conscientious 
objectors, Thacher began by comparing the rationale for religious exemptions 
to the principle of judicial review: “[W]hen the laws of Congress are contrary 
to the Constitution of the United States,” he stated, “they are void—So any law 
of man, or requisition under a human law, contrary to, or forbidden by the laws 
of Christ’s kingdom, are null and void.”74 Thacher then extended the analogy 
so as to clarify that exemptions, like judicial review, should apply only in 
“clear” cases.75 “[T]he laws of Christ’s kingdom, that are to be received by his 
disciples as paramount to all human laws,” he stated, “ought to be clear and ex-
 
gues, the more persuasive argument is that judicial deference was a substantial barrier to 
granting exemptions in dubious cases.  
 72. There is a distinction between finding conscientious scruples and establishing the 
underlying legal conclusions that form the basis for other constitutional claims. The exis-
tence of a contract, for instance, is established when a court declares its existence. While un-
derlying facts leading to the court’s conclusion might be doubtful, the legitimacy of the 
court’s decision is not. Religious scruples, however, are not a legal construct and therefore 
are subject to persistent doubt. 
 73. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Persons Having Conscientious Scruples Against 
Bearing Arms § 2, 1827 Ill. Laws 296, 297 (requiring “an acknowledgement in writing be-
fore some judge or justice of the peace of the county in which such person resides, that he in 
sincerity and truth has conscientious scruples against bearing arms”); An Act to Regulate 
and Discipline the Militia of This State, 1807 Md. Laws 339, 339 (requiring “a certificate 
from a licensed preacher of the Gospel, or signed by the proper officer of the religious socie-
ty to which such person may belong, stating that he has reason to believe, and verily does 
believe, from the religious and exemplary deportment and uniform declarations of such per-
son, that he is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms”); An Act to Exempt the Persons 
Therein Mentioned from the Performance of Military Duty § 1, 1820 N.Y. Laws 252, 252 
(requiring “oath or affirmation, before any justice of the peace or other magistrate, that they 
are religiously and conscienciously [sic] opposed to the bearing of arms”); Commonwealth 
v. Cornman, 4 Serg. & Rawle 83, 85 (Pa. 1818) (citing the 1816 state militia act exempting 
conscientious objectors without any showing of religious scruples). 
 74. PERLEY, supra note 57, at 192.  
 75. Id. at 193. 
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press.”76 Thacher then explained how to locate “clear” conscientious scruples. 
Those who “contend for the exemption on the ground of the demand being 
against conscience,” he explained, should “point out the law in the christian 
code which clearly prohibits, or means counter” to the application of the law.77 
In other words, Christian claims for religious exemptions should be recognized 
only when the objections had explicit textual support in the Bible. 
This Note has developed a theory to explain the scarcity of judicially en-
forced religious exemptions prior to the Civil War. This theoretical account in-
corporates other religious liberty decisions and broader perspectives on nine-
teenth-century constitutional adjudication so that we can try to read the few 
extant religious exemption cases on their own terms. Part III turns to the ex-
emption cases and tests the theory, trying to identify the extent to which out-
comes were influenced by theology, skepticism, deference, and constitutional 
meaning. 
III. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION CASES 
There are few reported cases from the nineteenth century in which a state 
or federal court addressed the constitutional basis for religious exemptions. As 
explained in Part II, many factors—including the relatively limited scope of 
governmental power—contributed to the paucity of conflict between law and 
religious doctrine. And those few religious groups with views that did conflict 
with the law were often entitled to statutory or administrative exemptions. For 
instance, many Quakers refused to swear oaths and serve in the militia, but 
most states accommodated these beliefs by permitting affirmations instead of 
oaths and by exempting those with religious scruples from mandatory militia 
service. Similarly, Jewish jurors and witnesses were commonly recused from 
serving on Saturdays.78 These accommodations further narrowed the oppor-
tunities to litigate whether constitutionally protected religious liberty included a 
right to individual exemptions from facially neutral laws. 
Nevertheless, state courts did occasionally face exemption claims. The 
record of these cases supports the theory that courts acknowledged the principle 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 193-94. 
 78. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 107, 110 (1812) (“Before the 
recent statute, . . . Quakers, and persons scrupulous of taking judicial oaths, were either ex-
empted or excused from serving on the grand jury.”); Simon’s Ex’rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 
412, 416 (Pa. 1831) (“The religious scruples of persons concerned with the administration of 
justice will receive all the indulgence that is compatible with the business of government; 
and had circumstances permitted it, this cause would not have been ordered for trial on the 
Jewish Sabbath.”); Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binn. 554, 562 (Pa. 1813) (opinion of 
Yeates, J.) (“[P]ublic ministers of all denominations returned as jurors, have uniformly been 
excused by the Court on their application.”); State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 393, 
396 (1823) (noting “certain instances of individuals being excused” from jury duty on ac-
count of conscientious objection). 
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of constitutionally mandated accommodations but were nonetheless heavily in-
fluenced by prevailing theological views, skepticism of courtroom declarations 
of belief, and contemporary notions of judicial deference. These factors clarify 
tensions and ambiguities in early opinions that are unexplained in the existing 
literature. 
A. Pre-1850 Cases 
In 1823, the Constitutional Court of Appeals of South Carolina considered 
a case in which an individual asked for an exemption from jury duty on account 
of his conscientious objection to passing judgment on others. Writing for the 
court, Justice John Richardson79 rejected the juror’s request, stating that “man 
has no window in his breast, through which we may look into his heart and dis-
cover his real sentiments.”80 Importantly, the juror seems not to have grounded 
his objection in biblical authority. Without means to test the sincerity of de-
clared beliefs, the court worried about limiting the application of religious ex-
ceptions. “The precedent being once set,” Richards wrote, “who could distin-
guish in this respect, between the pious asseveration of a holy man and that of 
an accomplished villain? I can foresee no limits to the impositions which might 
follow, under so elastic a principle.”81 
Although some scholars have read this decision to denounce the idea of 
constitutionally mandated religious accommodations,82 the court’s decision is 
not entirely clear. Justice Richardson ostensibly rejected a right of exemption 
by quoting renowned English jurist Matthew Hale, who said, “[W]e are the mi-
nisters of the law, [and] her decrees constitute our justice.”83 He did not men-
tion the state constitution. Justice Richardson continued, however, by declaring 
that all religions believe “that man is bound to do his duty in whatever situation 
he may be placed by the God, whom he adores; a principle, which reconciles 
even the slave to his master.”84 He then emphatically rejected the religious ba-
sis for the juror’s claim: “[A]midst the growing distinctions among ourselves, 
upon doctrinal tenets, . . . there is no christian sect which does not enforce . . . 
the plain moral . . . of a ready obedience to the laws of the country.”85 Justice 
 
 79. A former Republican speaker of the South Carolina assembly and state attorney 
general, Richardson became a judge in 1818. 5 APPLETONS’ CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 243 (James Grant Wilson & John Fiske eds., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 
1888). 
 80. Willson, 13 S.C.L. at 394. 
 81. Id. at 395. 
 82. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 11, at 285. 
 83. Willson, 13 S.C.L. at 396. 
 84. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 85. Id. Judge Thacher took a similar approach to jurors’ religious objections by declar-
ing that the claimants were mistaken in their religious views: 
 [Thacher] had lately known some to claim an exemption from acting as jurors in capital 
trials, on the ground of conscientious scruples; and another who did not see his way clear to 
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Richardson was upfront about the impracticality of determining the sincerity of 
religious objections, but rather than disposing of the issue on constitutional 
grounds he articulated the higher spiritual authority common to all Christians. 
Confronted with a constitutional question, he justified his decision with reli-
gious exegesis. 
Justice Richardson’s analysis conflicts with modern First Amendment doc-
trine, which proscribes “all questions concerning the truth or falsity of . . . reli-
gious beliefs.”86 Invoking religious authority to supersede claims of conscien-
tious objection plainly offends this principle. In the early nineteenth century, 
however, courts were quite willing to correct individuals’ misapprehensions of 
their own religious views. No other court invoked Justice Richardson’s reli-
gious rationale for rejecting exemptions, but judge-made assessments of reli-
gious duties were common.  
Twenty-three years later, Justice Richardson and his South Carolinian col-
leagues considered a free exercise challenge in which a Jewish merchant ob-
jected to being fined under Charleston’s closing ordinance, which prohibited 
business transactions on Sundays.87 The defendant claimed the law violated the 
South Carolina Constitution, which protected “[t]he free exercise and enjoy-
ment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or prefe-
rence.”88 A unanimous court upheld the fine because the defendant remained 
free to practice his own religion.89 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged the 
possibility that the constitution required free exercise exemptions: 
If it were true that the commandment to keep the Sabbath day holy also re-
quired the Israelite to work six days, as closely and faithfully as he is to ob-
serve the 7th day as a day of rest, then indeed there might be a ground to say 
that the ordinance which requires him to desist, during Sunday, from a public 
business, the sale of goods, was unconstitutional.90 
After reviewing several passages in the Old Testament, however, the court de-
clared that Jewish merchants were not, in fact, religiously required to work six 
 
take the oath or affirmation of a grand juror, merely because it was impressed on his mind 
that he could do more good than by spending his time that way. These kind of consciences, 
he said, stood in need of instruction. 
PERLEY, supra note 57, at 198. Thacher claimed that being morally opposed to a practice was 
different than being religiously compelled to not obey a legal duty. 
 86. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944). 
 87. See City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 508-09 
(1846). Sunday law challenges were most frequently litigated on grounds other than con-
scientious objection. See Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L. 
REV. 675 (2000). 
 88. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1. The provision continued, “provided that the li-
berty of conscience hereby declared shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentious-
ness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.” Id. art. VIII, § 1. 
 89. See Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. at 527 (stating that the ordinance “does not require him to 
desecrate his own Sabbath”).  
 90. Id. at 528. 
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days,91 notwithstanding the biblical injunction “[s]ix days shalt thou labor.”92 
Thus, rather than rejecting religious exemptions entirely,93 the court explicitly 
acknowledged the possibility of such constitutional claims but refused a partic-
ular application because of the claimant’s misunderstanding of scripture.94 As 
the same court had done decades earlier, it expressed not only skepticism of the 
individual’s religious scruples but also a willingness to assess matters of theol-
ogy.  
The significance of judicial skepticism is further illustrated by several cas-
es addressing whether religious confessions were constitutionally privileged. 
The most famous of these decisions, People v. Philips,95 arose when a Catholic 
priest, called as a prosecution witness in a theft case, refused to testify about a 
parishioner’s confessional statements. The priest claimed constitutional immun-
ity from testifying because disclosing confessional statements would violate his 
religious duties. Sitting as judge of the Court of General Sessions, New York 
City Mayor DeWitt Clinton96 agreed that “[t]o decide that the minister shall 
promulgate what he receives in confession, is to declare that there shall be no 
penance; and this important branch of the Roman catholic religion would be 
thus annihilated.”97 Clinton accepted the priest’s sincerity and concluded: “Al-
though we differ from the witness and his brethren, in our religious creed, yet 
we have no reason to question the purity of their motives, or to impeach their 
good conduct as citizens.”98 A few subsequent decisions cited Philips appro-
vingly.99 
 
 91. Id. at 529. 
 92. Exodus 20:9 (King James). 
 93. But see Bradley, supra note 11, at 285 (stating that Benjamin, along with an ap-
pended lower court decision, “rejects conduct exemptions”). Bradley’s statement is correct 
insofar as it relates to the specific claims at issue in these cases, but the court in Benjamin 
was careful not to reject the exemption principle in the abstract. 
 94. It is unclear what the court meant when it said “there might be a ground to say that 
the ordinance . . . was unconstitutional.” Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. at 528 (emphasis added). Pos-
sibly the court was leaving the constitutional issue open for determination in a future case. 
Another explanation is that the court recognized the constitutional principle but realized that 
state interference with a sincerely held religious mandate may still be constitutional if aimed 
at “acts of licentiousness, or . . . practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.” 
S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1. 
 95. People v. Philips, WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA 5 
(New York, Edward Gillespy 1813) (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
 96. Clinton, a former U.S. Senator and nephew of Governor George Clinton, had re-
cently angered the national Republican Party by running for president in 1812 against James 
Madison. He later became a Democratic governor. Donald M. Roper, De Witt Clinton, in 5 
AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 77, 77-79 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999). 
 97. Philips, SAMPSON, supra note 95, at 111. 
 98. Id. at 114. 
 99. See Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 136 (1856) (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855) 
(upholding the constitutional basis for the priest-penitent testimonial privilege); see also 
Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 CAROLINA L.J. 202, 213 (1830) (S.C. Ch. Ct. 1827) (citing the 
holding in Philips approvingly as being respectful of religious liberty, though not mentioning 
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Several courts, however, denied an equivalent privilege for non-Catholics. 
In 1817, a lower court in New York considered a defendant’s claim that his 
confession to a Protestant pastor should be privileged under the state constitu-
tion. Rejecting the argument, the judge held that “there is a grave distinction 
between auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline, ac-
cording to the canons of the church, and those made to a minister of the gospel 
in confidence, merely as a friend or advisor.”100 The next year, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court heard a similar case in which a defendant asserted a privi-
lege for his confession made to fellow church members. “It is held to be the du-
ty of a member of a church to answer to all inquiries of his brethren respecting 
any evil reports touching his character or conduct,” the defense counsels ar-
gued. “If he refuses, he is punishable, by the ecclesiastical tribunals, for contu-
macy. If the church has a right to make the inquiry, the party is bound to an-
swer truly; and by complying with this obligation, which is binding on his 
conscience, he ought not to be exposed to temporal punishment.”101 Rather 
than refuting the notion of religious exemptions, the Massachusetts Solicitor 
General argued that “the confession, in this case, was not to the church, nor re-
quired by any known ecclesiastical rule. It was made to his friends and neigh-
bors, without any requisition, or even solicitation, on their parts.”102 Without 
explanation, the court ruled in favor of the state. 
These cases involving Protestants did not raise the precise religious exemp-
tion question addressed in Philips. In Philips, the witness refused to testify, 
stating that doing so would violate his own religious duties as a Catholic priest. 
In each Protestant case, by contrast, the witnesses had no conscientious 
scruples to testifying, and therefore the defendant’s only argument was that his 
conscientious objections to revealing his own prior declarations should be suf-
ficient to privilege the evidence. Nevertheless, the arguments made in the New 
York and Massachusetts cases suggest that exemptions were denied primarily 
because confessions were not mandated under Protestant doctrine. As Judge 
 
religious exemptions). Justice Scalia’s Boerne concurrence, however, belittled the impor-
tance of Philips: 
The closest one can come [to judicial enforcement of religious exemptions] in the period 
prior to 1850 is the decision of a New York City municipal court in 1813, holding that the 
New York Constitution of 1777 required acknowledgment of a priest-penitent privilege, to 
protect a Catholic priest from being compelled to testify as to the contents of a confession. 
Even this lone case is weak authority, not only because it comes from a minor court, but also 
because it did not involve a statute, and the same result might possibly have been achieved 
(without invoking constitutional entitlement) by the court’s simply modifying the common-
law rules of evidence to recognize such a privilege. 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omit-
ted). For a thorough reply, see Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
100. People v. Smith, 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 779, 784 (John D. Lawson ed., 1914) 
(N.Y. Oyer & Terminer 1817). 
101. Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 161, 161-62 (1818). 
102. Id. at 162. 
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Thacher noted, the legal basis for granting exemptions was quite narrow: 
“[O]pinions or convictions of conscience, as some may call them, are no legiti-
mate grounds for personal exemptions. Conscience, . . . ought rather to be con-
sidered as an impelling force, than a directing principle in human actions.”103 
Absent broad recognition of denominational rules that conflicted with the law, 
personal claims of conscientious scruples were insufficient. Thus, prevailing 
theological views about the primacy of denominational teachings framed how 
the judges assessed the sincerity of religious objections. 
Other cases highlighted the connections between these factors and contem-
porary notions of judicial deference. The importance of deference was particu-
larly apparent in Pennsylvania, which had the largest number of recorded ex-
emption cases of any state.104 The earliest Pennsylvania case, Stansbury v. 
Marks,105 reads in its entirety: 
In this cause (which was tried on Saturday, the 5th of April) the defendant of-
fered Jonas Phillips, a Jew, as a witness; but he refused to be sworn, because it 
was his Sabbath. The Court, therefore, fined him £10; but the defendant, af-
terwards, waving the benefit of his testimony, he was discharged from the 
fine. 
This short report suggests that Phillips asked for a religious accommodation, 
but it is unclear why the court refused his request.106 The next reported exemp-
tion case arose in 1817, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a 
claim by Abraham Wolf, a Jewish merchant, that the state’s Sunday law inter-
fered with his religious liberty.107 As in Benjamin,108 Wolf argued that, com-
bined with his obligation to observe Sabbath on Saturday, God’s command-
ment “[s]ix days shalt thou labor”109 meant that he had a religious duty to work 
on Sunday. Rejecting Wolf’s claim, Justice Jasper Yeates110 wrote that “the 
Jewish Talmud . . . asserts no such doctrine.”111 As Michael McConnell ob-
 
103. PERLEY, supra note 57, at 191.  
104. Cf. Bradley, supra note 11, at 277-82; McConnell, supra note 11, at 1506-10.  
105. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213 (Pa. 1793). 
106. As argued in this Note, the lack of a judicially cognizable right to religious exemp-
tions was not the only ground upon which these claims were denied. 
107. Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48, 49 (Pa. 1817). 
108. See City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 527 (1846); 
see also infra text accompanying notes 87-94. 
109. Exodus 20:9 (King James). 
110. A Federalist, Yeates was appointed as an associate justice in 1791 and survived 
impeachment proceedings brought by the Republican legislature in 1805. James H. Peeling, 
Jasper Yeates, in 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 56, at 606. 
111. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 50. Yeates then stated that rights of conscience were 
“never intended to shelter those persons, who, out of mere caprice, would directly oppose 
those laws, for the pleasure of shewing their contempt and abhorrence of the religious opi-
nions of the great mass of the citizens.” Id. at 51. 
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serves, “[t]he unstated assumption was that if the law had required Wolf to vi-
olate his conscience, he might have had a claim.”112 
The next two Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions are among the most 
explicit authorities against judicially enforced religious exemptions. In Com-
monwealth v. Lesher,113 the court upheld a lower court’s exclusion of a pros-
pective juror in a murder trial on the basis that “he had conscientious scruples 
on the subject of capital punishment, and that he would not, because he con-
scientiously could not, consent or agree to a verdict of murder.”114 The court 
had little trouble disposing of the appeal, stating that “scruples of a juror, 
whether real or not, (for into their genuineness no human tribunal can easily in-
quire,)” were sufficient to disqualify a biased juror.115 But the court rested its 
decision only on the effect that a biased juror might have on the proceedings; 
its reasoning did not depend on any notion of religious freedom. In closing, the 
court clarified that “scruples of conscience in a juror, no matter how genuine 
they are, if there is no challenge on either side for that cause, cannot be taken 
notice of by the law.”116 
In Simon’s Executors v. Gratz,117 Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson 
wrote for the court in denying the religious liberty claim of Levi Philips, a Jew-
ish plaintiff who moved for a continuance so that he would not have to attend 
court on Saturday. Chief Justice Gibson confronted the religious exemption is-
sue directly, stating: 
The religious scruples of persons concerned with the administration of justice, 
will receive all the indulgence that is compatible with the business of govern-
ment; and had circumstances permitted it, this cause would not have been or-
dered for trial on the Jewish Sabbath. But when a continuance for conscience’ 
sake, is claimed as a right, and at the expense of a term’s delay, the matter as-
sumes a different aspect.118 
According to Chief Justice Gibson, “considerations of policy address them-
selves with propriety to the legislature, and not to a magistrate whose course is 
 
112. McConnell, supra note 11, at 1507.  
113. 17 Serg. & Rawle 155 (Pa. 1828). 
114. Id. at 155. 
115. Id. at 160.  
116. Id. In dissent, Chief Justice Gibson noted that “the truth is, this opinion [against 
serving on juries in capital cases] is not held by the Society of Friends as a body; as I have 
heard a gentleman of that denomination, who honourably discharges a high judicial trust, 
repeatedly declare.” Id. at 162 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting). 
117. 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831). 
118. Id. at 416. Justice Duncan expressed similar sentiments in dicta in an 1818 case: 
[C]ourts will respect the religious scruples of all men, yet this respect must not carry them, in 
the administration of justice, to adopt principles unknown to the constitution and the laws, 
and subversive of the execution of laws which they have reason to observe; but courts, civil 
and military, and the officers who execute laws repugnant to the conscientious scruples of 
respectable societies, will always perform the duties with tenderness, and in a way least of-
fensive to their sincere and honest prejudices; but still the laws must be obeyed. 
Commonwealth v. Cornman, 4 Serg. & Rawle 83, 101 (Pa. 1818) (Duncan, J., concurring). 
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prescribed not by discretion, but rules already established.”119 Thus, Chief Jus-
tice Gibson did not reject the policy merits or even the constitutional basis of 
religious exemptions; rather, he rejected their judicial enforcement. Interesting-
ly, though perhaps coincidentally, Chief Justice Gibson ruled in favor of Philips 
on an unrelated ground.120 
The Pennsylvania cases play a prominent but overstated role in the histori-
cal critique of religious exemptions. Gerard Bradley argues that “Pennsylvania 
was, by all accounts, among the two or three most liberal colonies (and later, 
states) on the subject of religious liberty. If the conduct exemption did not fly 
there, we should not expect it to fly anywhere else.”121 Pennsylvania, however, 
was also one of the states most hostile to judicial review. Historian Gordon 
Wood states that “[o]f all the struggles over the law and judiciary that took 
place in the states during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, proba-
bly the longest and most intense occurred in Pennsylvania.”122 In 1817, Chief 
Justice William Tilghman had articulated a limited role for judicial oversight, 
stating that “to declare a law void, when it violates the Constitution of this state 
or of the United States . . . is a power of high responsibility, and not to be exer-
cised but in cases free from doubt.”123 His successor, Chief Justice Gibson, fa-
mously rejected judicial review almost entirely,124 thus providing, in the words 
of McConnell, “reason to doubt that he represented the prevailing view on the 
interpretation of free exercise.”125 Given the Pennsylvania court’s highly re-
 
119. Simon’s Ex’rs, 2 Pen. & W. at 417. 
120. The suit was restored because bystander jurors had been taken from outside of the 
courthouse. See id. at 413; see also id. at 417 (“I am for setting aside this non-suit, certainly 
not for any supposed interference with the rights of conscience.”). The legal merits of this 
ruling are unknown. 
121. Bradley, supra note 11, at 277. 
122. WOOD, supra note 38, at 426; see also McConnell, supra note 3, at 1509 (pointing 
out that Chief Justice Gibson’s views were idiosyncratic). The 1803 impeachment of Alex-
ander Addison exemplifies the legislature’s hostility towards Federalist judges who opposed 
the will of the people. See WOOD, supra note 38, at 427. Lesher and Simon’s Executors fol-
lowed shortly after a virulent fight in Kentucky over judicial review. See Theodore W. Rug-
er, “A Question Which Convulses a Nation”: The Early Republic’s Greatest Debate About 
the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 827, 829 (2004). For late eighteenth-century 
views of judicial review in Pennsylvania, see Treanor, supra note 70, at 498-99. 
123. Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Bank v. Smith, 3 Serg. & Rawle 63, 73 (Pa. 1817). Chief Jus-
tice Tilghman also endorsed a case-by-case approach to deciding constitutionality rather than 
relying on strict distinguishing principles. Id. at 71 (“I confess, that to lay down a rule which 
would decide all cases, appears to me to be very difficult, perhaps impossible. One may be 
certain, that particular cases are not within the meaning of a law, without being able to enu-
merate all the cases that are within it. To attempt such enumerations, is unnecessary and 
dangerous, lest some should be omitted.”). 
124. See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 356 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, C.J., dissent-
ing). For a thorough appraisal of Chief Justice Gibson’s views, see Craig C. Murray, Chief 
Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 32 U. PITT. L. REV. 
127 (1970). 
125. McConnell, supra note 3, at 1509. 
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strained approach to judicial review, its rejection of free exercise claims is un-
remarkable. Judicially enforceable exemptions presuppose judicial enforcement 
of constitutional rights. 
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was initially hostile to judicial 
review, the court eventually embraced the moderate form of judicial deference 
used in most other states. Even Chief Justice Gibson experienced a personal 
conversion,126 declaring in 1845: 
There must be some independent organ to arrest unconstitutional legislation, 
or the citizen must hold his property at the will of an uncontrollable power. It 
would be useless for the people to impose restrictions on legislation if the acts 
of their agents were not subject to revision.127 
The court’s change of heart provided a potential opportunity to reassess the 
scope of constitutionally protected religious liberty.  
That opportunity came in Specht v. Commonwealth,128 when the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court reexamined whether a law prohibiting Sunday labor un-
constitutionally interfered with the religious exercise of those who observed the 
Sabbath on Saturday. Writing for the court and joined by Chief Justice Gibson, 
Justice Thomas Bell stated that under the Sunday law proscriptions “every one 
is left at full liberty to shape his own convictions, and practically to assert them 
to the extent of a free exercise of his religious views. . . . [The law] does not, in 
the slightest degree, infringe upon the Sabbath of any sect, or curtail their free-
dom of worship.”129 In response to the defendant’s argument that as a Seventh 
Day Adventist he was conscientiously required to work six days per week, Jus-
tice Bell wrote:  
Were this so, the law which compels him to inaction upon one of the six, 
might well be regarded as an invasion of his conscientious convictions. . . . 
But without other evidence than the mere suggestion of counsel, we cannot be-
lieve that the religious sect to which the plaintiff in error belongs, have so con-
strued this commandment as to make it imperative on its members, literally, to 
labour on every day of the week other than the seventh.130  
Again, a court acknowledged the principle of exemptions but rejected them in 
the case at hand. 
Religious exemptions were also addressed in the jury instructions in an 
1847 fugitive slave case. The defendant, who was sued in federal court for har-
boring slaves,131 alleged that he lacked the requisite fraudulent intent because 
he was merely fulfilling his religious obligations. He apparently cited Deute-
ronomy: “Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which has escaped 
 
126. See Murray, supra note 124, at 147-66. 
127. Menges v. Wertmann, 1 Pa. 218, 222 (1845). 
128. 8 Pa. 312 (1848). 
129. Id. at 324-25. 
130. Id. at 326. 
131. Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F. Cas. 1036 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 16,865); see al-
so Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302. 
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from his master unto thee.”132 Responding to this argument, U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Robert Grier133 explained that the biblical passage referred to re-
turning slaves to another country—not harboring escaped slaves within the 
United States.134 He instructed the jury: 
[F]raudulent intent required by the act to constitute illegal harbouring, is not to 
be measured by the religious or political notions of the accused, or the cor-
rectness or perversion of his moral perceptions. Some men of disordered un-
derstanding or perverted conscience may conceive it a religious duty to break 
the law, but the law will not tolerate their excuse. . . . [L]et no morbid sympa-
thy—no false respect for pretended “rights of conscience”—prevent either 
court or jury from judging him justly.135 
Grier then cited the Right Reverend Jeremy Taylor: “Nothing is more usual . . . 
than to pretend conscience to all the actions of men. . . . The disobedient refuse 
to submit to the laws, and they also in many cases pretend conscience.”136  
It is unclear whether the defendant claimed a constitutional right to a reli-
gious exemption, though the record implies that he was merely arguing that he 
did not have the mens rea required by the statute. Nevertheless, Justice Grier’s 
statements reveal a deep skepticism of the defendant’s claims of religious 
scruples. Not only did Justice Grier explicitly refute the application of Deute-
ronomy to fugitive slaves within the United States, but he also indicated that 
the defendant’s claims were insincere. Indeed, the defendant did not make any 
showing that his views were grounded in religious principles held by anyone 
else in his church. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that any claim to religious 
liberty would have overcome enforcement of the fugitive slave laws in the 
heightened political environment of the late 1840s.137 
 
132. Van Metre, 28 F. Cas. at 1039 (citing Deuteronomy 23:15). 
133. A Democrat and native of Pennsylvania, Grier was nominated to the Supreme 
Court in 1846. He was quickly confirmed, partly because he fervently opposed abolition. See 
Stuart A. Streichler, Robert Cooper Grier, in 9 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 
96, at 583. 
134. See Van Metre, 28 F. Cas. at 1039. 
135. Id. at 1041. 
136. Id.  
137. Justice Grier was a fervent opponent of abolitionism. Streichler, supra note 96, at 
583. In another fugitive slave harboring case, Judge John McLean instructed the jury that 
“much has been said of the laws of nature, of conscience, and the rights of conscience. This 
monitor, under great excitement, may mislead, and always does mislead, when it urges any 
one to violate the law.” Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1045 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 
7501). On consideration of a motion to retry the case, Judge McLean stated:  
If convictions, honest convictions they may be, of what is right or wrong, are to be substi-
tuted as a rule of action in disregard of the law, we shall soon be without law and without 
protection. . . . If the law be wrong in principle, or oppressive in its exactions, it should be 
changed in a constitutional mode.  
Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1048-49 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7502). There is no 
indication that the defendant asserted a First Amendment right to exemption, nor is it clear 
that the defendant’s claim was religious rather than based solely on moral conviction. 
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B. A New Context 
A final antebellum case in 1854 presaged a new era for religious exemption 
claims. In Donahoe v. Richards,138 the Maine Supreme Court considered an 
appeal of a Catholic student’s expulsion from public school for refusing to read 
from the King James Bible. The fifteen-year-old student and her father asserted 
that reading from a Protestant translation violated their conscientious beliefs as 
well as the explicit instructions of the local priest. Writing for the court, Justice 
John Appleton explicitly rejected the principle of religious exemptions: 
The conscientious belief of religious duty furnishes no legal defence to the 
doing or refusing to do what the State within its constitutional authority may 
require. If it were so, the obligations of a statute would depend not upon the 
will of the State, but upon its conformity with the religious convictions of its 
members.139 
He noted that “the existence of conscientious scruples as to the reading of a 
book can only be known from the assertion of the child, its mere assertion must 
suffice.”140 Appleton’s opinion, however, was premised on far more than skep-
ticism of individual beliefs. The right of religious exemptions, he stated, “un-
dermines the power of the State. It is, that the will of the majority shall bow to 
the conscience of the minority, or of one.”141 
Justice Appleton cited earlier nineteenth-century exemption cases, but his 
opinion was a clear departure from their logic and scope. Rather than deferring 
to legislative judgments or ensuring the veracity of individual claims, he firmly 
declared the authority of the state over matters of individual conscience: “A law 
is not unconstitutional, because it may prohibit what a citizen may conscien-
tiously think right, or require what he may conscientiously think wrong. The 
State is governed by its own views of duty.”142 Continuing, Appleton hinted at 
the fears motivating his decision: “[T]he constitution . . . acknowledges no 
government external to itself—no ecclesiastical or other organization as having 
power over its citizens, or any right to dispense with the obligation of its 
laws.”143 Appleton’s meaning was readily apparent to his contemporaries: al-
lowing religious exemptions would give the Pope authority over American law. 
Moreover, he stated: 
The right or wrong of the State, is the right or wrong as declared by legislative 
Acts constitutionally passed. It may pass laws against polygamy, yet the 
Mormon or Mahomedan cannot claim an exemption from their operation, or 
 
138. 38 Me. 379 (1854). 
139. Id. at 412; see also THE BIBLE IN SCHOOLS: ARGUMENT OF RICHARD H. DANA, JR., 
ESQ., AND OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MAINE 24-32 (Boston, Sabbath Sch. Soc’y 
1855) (argument of defense counsel Richard Henry Dana Jr. against the plaintiff’s constitu-
tional claim). 
140. 38 Me. at 408. 
141. Id. at 409. 
142. Id. at 410. 
143. Id. at 409-10. 
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freedom from punishment imposed upon their violation, because they may be-
lieve, however conscientiously, that it is an institution founded on the soundest 
political wisdom, and resting on the sure foundation of inspired revelation.144 
Appleton’s reference to Mormon polygamy may have quieted even the most 
fervent advocates of broadly defined religious freedom. 
Indeed, the conscientious objections of the mid-nineteenth century were a 
far cry from the relatively harmless claims raised decades earlier. In 1852, 
Brigham Young had famously announced a divine revelation extolling plural 
marriage.145 The claim ignited a national furor. Freedom of religion had given 
way to freedom of religious invention, and Mormon teachings were challenging 
American society’s deepest-held views on family organization.146 Moreover, 
widespread immigration was bringing throngs of Catholics to American cities, 
escalating religious tensions and sparking anti-immigrant backlash. Anti-
Catholicism in New England exploded in 1854 when the nativist Know-
Nothing Party garnered a majority of the Massachusetts popular vote in state-
wide and local races.147 The growing Catholic population was especially 
threatening to New England’s public school system, where Horace Mann had 
ostensibly achieved a delicate religious balance by requiring nonsectarian Bible 
readings.148 By 1854, many thought that unrestrained religious liberty threat-
ened to unravel the social and religious fabric of the nation. 
The new religious context brought both challenges and changes to Ameri-
can constitutional law and gave rise to the U.S. Supreme Court’s first free exer-
cise decisions, which denied a constitutional basis for religious exemptions.149 
Donahoe v. Richards was merely one court’s approach to the exemption ques-
tion, but Justice Appleton’s opinion illustrates the overriding importance of 
 
144. Id. at 410. 
145. Joseph Smith was said to have received this revelation in 1843, though it remained 
a secret until Young’s 1852 proclamation. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD 
WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 730-31 (2007). 
146. See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 29-33, 45-49 (2002); see al-
so NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000). The 
Republican Party platform in 1856 attempted to tie Mormon polygamy with master-slave 
relations on Southern plantations. See GORDON, supra, at 55-58. 
147. Dale Baum, Know-Nothingism and the Republican Majority in Massachusetts: The 
Political Realignment of the 1850s, 64 J. AM. HIST. 959, 960 n.4 (1978). Bradley hints at 
immigration’s potential impact on free exercise jurisprudence. See Bradley, supra note 11, at 
286 (“[I]t would be helpful to see how the great Irish and German Catholic immigrations of 
the late 1840s affected interpretation of Free Exercise.”). 
148. See R. Laurence Moore, Bible Reading and Nonsectarian Schooling: The Failure 
of Religious Instruction in Nineteenth-Century Public Education, 86 J. AM. HIST. 1581, 
1588-90 (2000). 
149. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (denying a religious ex-
emption from a federal polygamy law). Interestingly, while others argued that the First 
Amendment protected Mormon polygamy, see, e.g., GORDON, supra note 146, at 89, this 
was not the defendant’s legal argument in Reynolds, id. at 131-32. The Court addressed the 
issue anyway. 
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contemporary political debates.150 Banning polygamy was self-evidently con-
stitutional, and judges reached for interpretive tools to arrive at that end.151 
These transformations hardly prove or disprove the constitutional basis for reli-
gious exemptions earlier in the century, but they remind us that the methods for 
defining constitutional rights in one period may vary drastically from those 
used in another. Adjudicating constitutional questions is a form of politics, and 
context matters. 
CONCLUSION 
By drawing on a broad array of other religious liberty cases as well as re-
cent scholarship on judicial deference, this Note has expanded the lens through 
which scholars can view and contextualize exemption decisions. In particular, 
judges were highly skeptical of individual declarations of belief. When granted 
by statute, religious exemptions often required affidavits from religious leaders 
in order to prove conscientious scruples. And steeped in a culture of judicial 
deference, courts were loath to define their own process for determining reli-
gious sincerity. As Judge Thacher asked in 1819: “[W]ho was to determine 
what a man’s conscientious scruples were; and when they were sincere?”152 
For him, religious dictates “ought to be clear and express,”153 else they become 
mired in the misapprehensions or insincerity of individual claimants. 
Though the record is sparse, early nineteenth-century religious exemption 
cases are consistent with this theoretical account. Lower court decisions in New 
York154 and Virginia155 accommodated priests, whose religious scruples 
against disclosing confessions were beyond dispute. And state supreme courts 
 
150. Justice Appleton was also at the forefront of calls to liberalize witness competency 
rules. His jurisprudence therefore illustrates not only a turn away from religious exemptions 
but also a transition from the judicial skepticism that had formerly kept those exemptions in 
check. See Fisher, supra note 42, at 666-67, 678-79. 
151. Donahoe was followed in Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 454, 470 (1876). Moreo-
ver, contemporary public opinion widely supported the Reynolds decision. See Sarah Barrin-
ger Gordon, Law and Religion, 1790-1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN 
AMERICA 417, 433 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). But see Kurt T. 
Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994) (arguing that the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated an expansive version of religious freedom unimagined at the 
founding). Lash’s argument is opposite to mine, though our focuses are different. Instead of 
case law, he concentrates on the intent of those who passed the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, his reliance on debates about former slaves skews his analysis, and he never ex-
plains how the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment squared their ostensible support for 
religious exemptions with simultaneous persecutions of Mormon polygamists. 
152. PERLEY, supra note 57, at 189. 
153. Id. at 193. 
154. People v. Philips, SAMPSON, supra note 95, at 5 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
155. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128 (1856) (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855). 
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in Pennsylvania156 and South Carolina157 acknowledged in dicta that exemp-
tions may be judicially enforceable. Still, protection of a substantive, individual 
right to religious liberty was highly constrained. Courts and legislatures gener-
ally used sectarian doctrine and membership as a proxy for individual belief. 
And whenever claimants’ sincerity was in doubt, judges always denied their 
accommodation requests. 
Beginning in the 1850s, however, skepticism was no longer a sufficient 
means of limiting religious exemptions. Earlier in the century, Protestant as-
sumptions about the sole authority of scripture effectively confined accommo-
dation claims to those based on a close reading of the biblical text,158 thus pre-
venting the anarchical potential of religious exemptions from seriously 
challenging the legal system’s vitality. Mormon revelations and Catholic immi-
gration eviscerated these unstated limits on free exercise. Constitutional prin-
ciples widely accepted several decades earlier were now at odds with funda-
mental societal values and a virulently anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon political 
climate.  
To the extent that nineteenth-century decisions are consistent with the 
meanings of the Free Exercise Clause as enacted in 1791 and incorporated in 
1868,159 the historical record poses a significant problem for originalist metho-
dology. Accounting for skepticism and deference, early opinions suggest that 
freedom of religion clauses granted substantive, individual protection from both 
neutral and discriminatory laws. As articulated in Donahoe v. Richards and lat-
er affirmed in the Supreme Court’s famous polygamy decisions, however, the 
prevailing understanding of religious liberty around the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not ensure a general safe harbor for individual religious prac-
tices. Government could not explicitly prohibit religious exercise, but individu-
als did not have a right of exemption from neutral and generally applicable 
laws. 
Essentially, the problem here is that the framers and ratifiers of the Four-
teenth Amendment were not originalists.160 Modern courts are unlikely to re-
 
156. Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 326 (1848). 
157. City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 528 (1846). 
158. Early nineteenth-century religious experience placed greater emphasis on individ-
uals rather than trained ministers, but biblical text remained the ultimate authority. See 
HATCH, supra note 21, at 179-83. 
159. As stated several times, this Note is largely confined to evaluating nineteenth-
century case law—evidence widely acknowledged as relevant, but certainly not dispositive, 
to discerning the original meanings of religious liberty in 1791 and 1868. 
160. The accepted meaning of several important provisions of the Bill of Rights had 
changed significantly by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. See, e.g., 
SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006) (arguing that an individual rights view of the Second 
Amendment was largely absent at the founding but widespread by the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of 
the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (arguing that the incorporated 
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ject incorporation or apply differing First Amendment constraints on the federal 
and state governments.161 But fidelity to original meaning requires that origi-
nalists wrestle with these historical discrepancies.162 This paradox is probably 
intractable. Originalism cannot, in combination with our current approach to 
incorporation, account for shifts in constitutional meaning between the ratifica-
tion of the Bill of Rights and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.163  
Understanding the nineteenth-century context exposes a deep irony in Jus-
tice Scalia’s opinion in Boerne. Justice Scalia cites the historical record—a 
body of evidence pervasively shaped by judicial deference to legislatures—to 
prove why Congress should not have a role in defining the scope of constitu-
tionally protected religious liberty.164 There are persuasive reasons why one 
might agree with Justice Scalia in opposing religious exemptions, but the lack 
of early precedent should not be one of them. Judges in the first half of the ni-
neteenth century did occasionally recognize the constitutional basis for free ex-
ercise exemptions, but their decisions were guided by radically different under-
 
Establishment Clause included a nonestablishment principle, whereas the Establishment 
Clause originally aimed at federalism concerns); see also Ryan C. Williams, The One and 
Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010) (arguing that the meaning 
of due process included substantive protections in 1868 but not in 1791). 
161. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
162. Eugene Volokh has noted that nineteenth-century evidence is especially important 
“when the sources buttress the evidence offered by late-1700s sources,” but he provides no 
account of what an originalist should do if the nineteenth-century evidence conflicts. Vo-
lokh, supra note 17, at 1068 n.64. Volokh, however, does acknowledge that understanding 
the meaning of the incorporated First Amendment requires “understanding the original 
meaning of the First Amendment in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.” 
Id. Indeed, whether incorporation takes effect through the Fourteenth Amendment’s protec-
tions of “liberty” and “due process,” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031-32, or the “privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States,” id. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment), an original public meaning originalist understands those words 
according to their meaning in 1868—not in some prior period. See, e.g., id. at 3042 (majority 
opinion) (“[T]he Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to 
keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered li-
berty.”); id. at 3086 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he 
inquiry [should] focus[] on what the ratifying era understood the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to mean . . . .”); id. at 3088 (“[T]he Framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
and the ratifying-era public understood—just as the Framers of the Second Amendment 
did—that the right to keep and bear arms was essential to the preservation of liberty.”). 
163. The dilemma is especially thorny in the free exercise context, where the latter in-
corporated meaning, as suggested by nineteenth-century cases, was less protective of indi-
vidual rights than the earlier meaning. For another example of such a shift, see John Fabian 
Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 
1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825 (1999) (arguing that protections against self-incrimination 
had eroded significantly by the mid-nineteenth century). 
164. In this respect, this Note supports McConnell’s argument that Congress should 
have interpretive authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Michael W. McConnell, 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
153 (1997). 
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lying assumptions. By looking beyond outcomes we can begin to appreciate the 
transformations that separate us from our constitutional past.  
